Chiang confessed in his later years that he didn’t blame anyone for the loss of the country but the real culprits were these two men

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Wen Wenshidao

Before the outbreak of the Liberation War, the Kuomintang held an absolute advantage in terms of both strength and weaponry.

Coupled with the support of the Americans behind them, Chiang was therefore confident that he could easily win that war.

However, the course of the Liberation War later greatly exceeded his expectation. In just over three years, his 8 million troops were defeated and could only run to the isolated islands for shelter.

After arriving at Taiwan, Chiang was never willing to do so, and his profoundly conducted many reflections as he plotted a counter-offensive.

At the beginning of this century, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University published Chiang’s notes from his later years.

In it, Chiang explained the reasons for his failure in a whining manner, writing that he blamed no one else but Li Zongren and the then US Secretary of State, George Huntlett Marshall, for the loss of the country.

Li Zongren, who was unable to fulfill his duties.

In Chiang’s mind, the first person who was considered the culprit for his loss of the mainland was Hu Zongnan.

Among the senior generals of the Kuomintang, Hu Zongnan had obvious shortcomings when compared to Wang Yaowu, Xue Yue, Hu Lian and other outstanding generals when it came to military skills.

However, because of Hu’s deep friendship with Chiang and his unconditional obedience to Chiang’s orders, Chiang favored Hu and promoted him again and again.

With Chiang’s support, Hu Zongnan’s career was like a rocket. By the end of the war, he had risen to the high position of commander of the first war zone, with 450,000 troops in his hands, and for a while, the scenery was boundless.

However, the good times didn’t last long. With the outbreak of the Liberation War, Chiang had high hopes for Hu Zongnan, hoping that he would be able to lead a heavy army and conquer the northern Shaanxi Province in one fell swoop.

At that time, the total strength of the Northwest Field Army led by General Peng was only 26,000 men, which was nothing compared to Hu Zongnan’s strength, and it was far behind its opponent both in terms of weaponry and logistical supplies.

What is even more unfavorable is that Hu Zongnan also got the support of the Northwest Erma, which makes the situation of our army exceptionally severe.

However, even so Hu Zongnan’s military command ability is a big disappointment.

On the battlefield, he was always led by the nose by Mr. Peng, losing a regiment today and having a brigade eaten tomorrow.

In less than three years, hundreds of thousands of troops in his hands were squandered by him, and eventually ended up with a defeat.

What Chiang hated even more was that in the late stage of the Liberation War, he staged a show of resignation in order to stabilize the military.

He did that mainly to boost his morale and was confident that he would run for the presidency if there was another election.

However, what Chiang never expected was that a Li Zongren jumped out at the very moment of the election, and later Li Zongren, with the support of the Americans, even won the election and became the Acting President.

It was against that background that Chiang had to bring all the things he could to Taiwan in one go.

In Chiang’s view, had it not been for Li Zongren’s being an enemy of himself, the National Government would not have collapsed so quickly, thus putting the greatest blame on Li Zongren.

The most ruthless Marshall

George Catlett Marshall was an important American politician and military man who played a key role during World War II and served as the U.S. Secretary of State after the war, exerting a profound influence on international affairs.

After the end of World War II, Marshall came to China as an American envoy with the important task of mediating the conflict between the Nationalist and Communist parties.

At that time, Chiang was confident that Marshall would be on his side because of the good relationship between the Kuomintang and the United States. However, the final result did not turn out as he had hoped.

Especially after Marshall witnessed the might and discipline of our army, his view changed radically.

He was deeply impressed by the cohesion and fighting strength of our army, and thought that it would be difficult for the Kuomintang to take advantage of such a powerful opponent.

In addition, the United States, out of its own interests, wanted China to remain divided so that it could better control this important region. So, they came up with a seemingly fair but actually quite well-intentioned proposal to reconcile the CCP.

However, this proposal touched Chiang’s sensitive nerve.

In his opinion, the conflict between the KMT and our party was so deep-rooted that it could never be resolved by a simple reconciliation.

The core issues of land distribution and political power were an insurmountable gap between the two parties.

For this reason, Chiang, who was disgruntled inwardly, began to doubt Marshall’s true motives, and he believed that Marshall was deliberately provoking and sabotaging his plans.

In this state of mind, he began to perfunctorily prepare for the launching of the final general attack on the one hand, and prepare for the launching of the final general attack on the other hand.

In 1946, with the failure of the offensive operation of the Nationalist forces in Taiyuan, the hope of reconciliation was completely dashed.

In the end, Marshall returned to the United States with loss and helplessness, while Chiang was plunged into a deeper dilemma.

Because of this, in Chiang’s mind, he also regarded Marshall as one of the culprits for his loss of the kingdom.

But in all fairness, perhaps Li Zongren and Marshall did intervene in Chiang’s unification, but it was definitely not a major factor, and could even be said to be a negligible influence.

The biggest reason for the loss of the Jiangshan still lay with the KMT under his own administration.

It has been said in China since ancient times that whoever wins the hearts of the people wins the world. Chiang’s ultimate failure could be said to have been caused by his turning his back on the will of the people, and his so-called culprit was just a piece of cloth to cover up his shame.

Readers, what do you think about Li Zongren and Marshall in Chiang’s eyes? If you like this article, please share and favorite it.

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