Pictures quoted from the web
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov.
On January 29, 2025, Bogdanov made a low-key trip to Syria to meet with Syrian transitional president Shara Jurani. The two sides spoke for more than three hours, and Bogdanov said the talks were constructive, but did not reveal much information.
Author: Huaihe Rain
Short Commentary
The U.S.-Ukraine conversation has been so hot that it’s ignored other geopolitical plates, and today it’s focusing its lens on Syria.
01
What does constructive mean?
Diplomatic rhetoric is very strict, except for the factional diplomatic language that spews from Trump’s mouth.
Generally speaking, when the word constructive appears in diplomatic discourse, it means that the two sides have had reasonable discussions and exchanges on an issue, but have not yet reached a final solution.
If it is constructive, it means that the outcome of the talks is somewhere between constructive and productive.
Negotiations or exchanges can only be productive if they have produced substantial results, or at least preliminary results.
Constructive is an appropriate term when the outcome of the conversation is productive but no agreement has been reached.
Therefore, constructive can be interpreted as meaning that there are clear differences between the two parties, and that they are willing to make certain compromises even though they have not reached an agreement.
Constructive is usually a good place to start.
Another clear proof of Bogdanov’s constructive statement is that the Hmeimim airbase and the Tartus naval base have not been forcibly taken back by the new Syrian government so far.
It’s not that the new government is incapable of taking back the bases, as the Russian army had only 2,000 to 3,000 troops stationed at the two bases.
After the light-speed collapse of the Bashar regime, the Russian army withdrew almost all of its armaments from Syria.
By about January 2025, both Hmeimim and Tartus will be empty.
This can be seen in satellite images released by the world’s leading MAXAR satellite imaging company, which show that the two military bases, which had been dotted with warships, missile trucks, vehicles, and military personnel, were largely emptied of all but immovable buildings.
Only a hundred or so Russian troops remain in Khmeimim and Tartus, and the logistical supplies for more than a hundred Russian troops are under the control of the new Syrian government.
It is not that these remaining personnel have become hostages; they can return to Russia at any time.
Considering that the previous withdrawal of Russian troops was not hasty, organized, planned and orderly, it was not an eviction.
Apparently, the Russians won’t leave, and the new transitional president of the Syrian government won’t take them back, simply because both sides believe that keeping the two military bases can be a bargaining chip in their own hands.
In Bashar poisoned? Talk to you, Shara, the man who toppled the Bashar regime, is a very complicated man.
On the one hand, he’s done his best to be inclusive, appointing women to senior government positions, allowing Christians in Syria to celebrate Christmas, and so on.
But on the other hand, Giulani is a very conservative Islamist.
When he meets female guests, he usually asks them to put on their headscarves.
If it’s a more distinguished female guest of honor and it’s not good to ask someone to put on the hijab, then Shahla will choose not to shake hands with the female guest.
Previously, German Foreign Minister Belbeck and French Foreign Minister Barrow had an embarrassing experience when they visited Syria.
In the face of such important diplomats of the highest rank of the Western powers, Shara only shook hands with Barrow, who was a man, and refused to shake hands with Belbeck, who was a female foreign minister.
This complex duality has left outsiders worried about Sharaa and whether he will lead Syria towards a modern democratic Islamic state like Turkey.
Or will he, like the previous Bashar regime, stay put or even regress, it is not known.
Shara is in good time, the most important foreign aid of the Bashar regime, Russia and Iran, are both in trouble, giving him a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to seize power.
The West doesn’t have time for him either; the Europeans and Americans have more troubling matters to deal with right now.
But the Russian-Ukrainian war will always be resolved, and no war goes on forever.
When the troubles plaguing Europe and the United States are resolved, both the United States and Europe will redirect their perspectives to the major hot geopolitical plates around the world, including the Middle East.
By then the Sharaa government will not have so much of a choice whether to take the conservative Iranian route, or the old Syrian regime route of yore. Or to take the Jordanian, Turkish, Egyptian route is the mandatory choice, and it is impossible to muddle through.
By ordering a siege of Russian military bases and not taking them back, Sharaa is in a way leaving himself leverage.
Despite the stunning geopolitical debacle that Russia has swallowed in the Middle East, it is, after all, a nuclear power and, in the eyes of the Shara, an object that can be utilized.
Syria’s Transitional President Sharaa Left with Turkey’s President Erdogan Right .
Sharaa was propped up by Turkey, and the Turks were Sharaa’s biggest gold-digger in the days when Sharaa was wanted by the U.S. with a bounty on his head. It was a time to fight, and Shara could be obedient to Turkey. After sitting on the throne, it would be against the national interest to be submissive to a single regional power. In order to balance the influence of Turkey, Shara needs to use all the objects that can be used.
02
Shara’s meeting with the Russian diplomatic delegation was at the end of January 2025, after which there was no news.
Recently some inside information has broken, presumably some progress in private negotiations.
All that can be gleaned so far is that Shara has made three offers
First, to forgive all of Syria’s foreign debt
Second, compensate Syria for its losses or provide it with reconstruction funds.
Third, extradite former Syrian President Bashar and return to the new Syrian government all the funds that Bashar took with him to Russia.
The second and the first can be considered as an egg-brother, as long as one of them is fulfilled.
Either pay up and provide the funds or forgive the foreign debt.
During the Bashar era, the Syrian Government’s annual revenues were only $3 billion to $4 billion, and its annual expenditures amounted to $8 billion to $1 billion.
Not to mention the cost of winning the civil war, even to maintain the normal operation of the government can not make ends meet, and the Bashar family has to make some money.
The reason why Bashar’s elite troops are fleeing is because they don’t have the money, a few hundred dollars a month in pay, what to play with their lives?
No way, their own blood machine blood supply is insufficient, so they have to go to borrow money.
According to the new government’s compendium, the Bashar regime has borrowed about $23 billion or so in foreign debt.
According to the current financial status of Syria, even if Sharaa himself were to be sold, he would not be able to pay off his donkey-load of foreign debts.
Although Syria has not released details of how much of the $23 billion belongs to Russia.
However, outsiders estimate that Syria’s foreign debt to Russia should be around $8 billion.
The source of the remaining $10 billion or so is in doubt, and it is unclear which countries have lent Syria the money.
Eight billion dollars for two military bases is a good deal.
Prior to the annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula, Russia leased Sevastopol Sevastosaposkaya Yuzhnaya Karankinaya, a total of four military ports, at a rent of $125 million a year, with the most important, Sevastopol, costing $97.7 million a year.
Once upon a time, the largest Soviet naval base abroad, Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, cost only $200 million a year in rent.
As a result, Russia was so short of money that it could not afford to pay that much and had to give up Cam Ranh Bay completely in 2002.
When the Russian economy improved, Moscow had made it clear that it wanted to return to Vietnam.
Starting in 2010, Russia and Vietnam opened negotiations.
But after all this time, Cam Ranh Bay has not been opened to Russia, and Russia regrets it.
Considering Vietnam’s geographic location, stationing a strong naval and air force in Cam Ranh Bay would be like hitting a nail in the coffin of an important Asia-Pacific node, and would be worth more than $200 million.
Now Russia is in the same predicament as before. If it gives up Tartus and Hermes, it will no longer have any foothold in the Middle East to project its military power.
Russia is a country with an average economy and average technology, with only nuclear weapons and energy to show for it.
Relying on these two, can indeed retain a place in the geopolitical game, but want to say a few more words, it depends on the depth of power projection.
Without military bases, it’s really hard to ensure how deep the depth is.
So from that perspective, there is no reason for Russia to give up its two major military bases.
But there are two sides to everything, and no all is good.
If the new Syrian government takes the Jordanian, Turkish and Egyptian route in the future, or even the route of friendship with the Gulf countries, it means that Syria’s state policy will be pro-Western.
This pro doesn’t necessarily mean an alliance with the United States or European countries, but it will definitely favor the West more substantially.
Russia’s role will be very awkward, and the worst outcome will be that Syria, after being forgiven its foreign debt, will turn its back on its debt and continue to demand that Russia return its two key military bases.
Or rather, the new Syrian government doesn’t want to turn the other cheek, but under the heavy pressure of the West, what choice is there?
The best outcome would be that the military bases would be retained, but with strict limits on the size of the Russian military presence, the number of weapons that could be deployed, and so on.
Military bases are preserved, but they don’t play much of a role.
The previous Bashar regime never restricted Russian military activities in Syria, and even Russian aircraft carriers could be deployed in the Tartus military port.
Military pivots without restrictions are the ones that can be most effective, and once a military base is restricted in the scale of its activities, there is nothing to fear.
If the new Syrian government then allows the West to monitor the activities of the Russians in real time, it would be tantamount to essentially nullifying the role of the two major military bases.
So a very chicken-and-egg situation for Russia.
No military bases to keep, nothing left.
Keep the military bases, and the role may be so limited as to amount to almost nothing.
Satellite photo of Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay Naval Base.
Considered one of the best deep-water harbors in the world, the Cam Ranh Bay Naval Base was granted to the USSR for the right to station troops at Cam Ranh Bay starting in 1979. By the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union had more than 6,000 military personnel at Cam Ranh Bay, making it its number one military base overseas. With the previous experience of Cam Ranh Bay, Russia will theoretically not give up its military base in Syria again, even if it has a limited role, it’s better than nothing.
03
Despite their respective concerns, it is highly probable that Russia will agree to forgive foreign debt in exchange for access to the military base in order to preserve its overseas pivot.
As for Bashar in #3, let’s be honest, Bashar is just a bargaining chip right now.
Extradition back to Bashar is a sham, the money behind it is the real goal.
I’ve been thinking about Russia’s problems before, and if Bashar is extradited, Russia could be in trouble one way or another.
After all, you were the ones who brought Bashar’s entire family to Russia in the first place and had to provide security in front of the whole world.
If this is handed over, then the reputation of the Russians will really deteriorate.
Russia’s reputation is bad right now, but that’s not good in the West, it’s okay in some countries, like Venezuela.
It’s the reputation in those countries that is a concern for settling the whole Bashar family.
It would be difficult for Russia to extradite Bashar back to Syria as a last resort.
In fact, from Shara’s point of view, Bashar is also a hot potato for the Syrian transitional government under his leadership.
Bashar’s regime has fallen, but it still has enough influence among the Alawites in Syria.
Bashar and his father Assad ruled in Syria for half a century, all kinds of preferential treatment of the Alawite faction, deep into the marrow of the influence is not a day or two, or even a year or two can not be eliminated.
In the meantime, Sharaa’s new government forces and Bashar’s old men have dried up.
It is not that the old men want to welcome back Bashar, for them, whoever is the emperor is the same, their power has to be safeguarded.
When Shahla wants to cut the feud, they naturally want to jump on the bandwagon.
The situation is so complicated that by extraditing back Bashar at this time, Shara is making things difficult for himself.
If Bashar is severely punished, such as by executing him, is Shara not afraid that the situation in the country will become even more volatile?
But if Bashar is not severely punished and is merely locked up, the Syrian people, who are full of hatred for Bashar, will not be able to give an explanation.
How did Gaddafi die in Libya? He was killed during the war, and that was during wartime.
There is friction within Syria now, but it’s not a period of large-scale full-scale civil war after all.
You can’t fool around with the excuse that you can’t kill Bashar because you accidentally scuffed a gun in the middle of a war.
The Iraqi Saddam type of death won’t work either; it was the new Iraqi government that tried Saddam, but in reality it was the US that was behind it all along.
It was the Americans who wanted Saddam dead, not the new Iraqi government.
So Bashar hiding in Russia is probably the best Bashar, and Bashar understands where he is now.
For months now, Bashar has kept his face out of sight, his words out of his mouth, and made himself completely transparent.
This is good, if he jumps up and down, the new Syrian government will not kill him.
So basically we can conclude that Bashar is probably safe, at least for the next few years.
And whether the Russian military bases can be retained or not will have to wait until the end of the Russia-Ukraine war.
Today there is only Russia, the new Syrian government and Turkey in the game, and this level of game is nothing.
When the big fish in Europe and the US end the Russia-Ukraine talk, and the goal turns to the Middle East, that’s when we’ll really see the difference.
END
Author Huaihe Rain, an unknown 90s self media writer, a single-celled liberal arts student, tries to share his views on the world with his friends!
In order to prevent loss of connection, new and old numbers can be followed together.
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