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Recently, Admiral Schneider, the new commander of the U.S. Army’s Pacific Air Forces, confessed in an interview that
China’s PLA Rocket Force has a rapidly growing stockpile of missiles, many of which have long ranges, all of which are designed to enhance China’s anti-intervention and area denial capabilities.
To put it bluntly, this is a set of tactics to prevent U.S. forces from easily entering China’s neighboring waters and airspace.
The U.S. military in the Asia-Pacific region has always gone wherever it wanted to go.
Gulf War Iraq War, the U.S. military are first in a safe area to build up a large number of troops, and only then began to fight.
But now the situation has changed.
China’s missile development is not a one-day thing.
From the time of the Taiwan Strait crisis in the 1990s, China’s missiles were not very accurate.
Now it has developed the Dongfeng 21D, a carrier-killer capable of hitting aircraft carriers, with a range of more than 1,500 kilometers.
There’s also the Dongfeng 26, which the U.S. military calls the Guam Killer, with a range of 4,000 kilometers, making even the U.S. base on Guam unsafe.
The missiles can be flown there in a few minutes at the push of a button.
The U.S. air and naval bases there could be struck soon.
According to statistics, China now has multiple short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.
These missiles have covered the area from the first to the second island chain.
Including some U.S. military bases in the Asia-Pacific region.
01
Distributed Deployment
Schneider said the U.S. military is going to change the way it fights and adopt distributed deployment .
What does that mean?
It means that instead of concentrating all military power in a few large bases, it will be spread out to many small bases.
That way, even if a few bases are knocked out, the rest of the country can still keep fighting.
Now the U.S. military has begun to look for more airfields and harbors to use in the Philippines Australia and other small Pacific islands.
They’re also developing a model called Agile Combat Deployment, which allows warplanes to land, take off, and resupply on airstrips, eliminating the need for large bases that can be easily destroyed.
As for guerrilla warfare , it means that the U.S. military is going to fight as if it were a guerrilla war.
Constantly changing positions so that Chinese missiles can’t find a clear target.
Today on this island, tomorrow will change to another island, so that the other side of the missile can not hit, or even if hit, the damage is limited.
The evolution of offense and defense in ancient warfare.
After the advent of city walls, the attacking side invented the ladder
After shields became popular, archers switched to armor-piercing arrows.
It’s a similar situation now, when Chinese missiles make the traditional centralized deployment of the US military dangerous, the US military will have to change its tactics.
The U.S. military established a series of large military bases in the Asia-Pacific region after World War II.
Together with the powerful aircraft carrier battle groups, it has formed the so-called island chain strategy.
The Asia-Pacific region is firmly under its control.
This model was so effective during the Cold War that it remained the watchword of the United States military even in the 1990s and 2000s.
However, things are changing.
In the case of aircraft carriers, a Nimitz-class carrier costs about $9 billion and has more than 5,000 sailors and 90 aircraft of various types on board.
It is considered a mobile airport at sea.
But, in front of China’s Dongfeng 21D anti-ship ballistic missile.
This behemoth may not last ten minutes.
The Dongfeng 21D is known as a carrier killer, with a range of over 1,500 kilometers, a speed that can reach more than 10 times the speed of sound, and kinetic energy from the missile’s descent that’s strong enough to penetrate the carrier’s armor.
Then look at the fixed bases.
U.S. bases such as Yokosuka Yokota Iwakuni in Japan, Osan in South Korea, and Anderson in Guam used to be springboards for U.S. forces to project power.
But now, they’re all within range of Chinese missiles.
In the event of war, these bases could be destroyed in a matter of hours.
Exercises during the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 2022 showed that Chinese missiles are already quite accurate, with multiple missiles landing no more than 10 meters off target.
This means they are capable of striking key facilities such as hangars and command centers with pinpoint accuracy.
Faced with this situation, the U.S. military began to change its thinking.
Whereas in the past the U.S. military’s mindset was big and strong, it has now become small and scattered.
Today it is in this hilltop, tomorrow it will change to another valley, so that people can not find a clear target.
In the Philippines, the U.S. military has been authorized to use nine military bases.
These bases are small, but scattered throughout.
Instead of relying on a few large bases, the U.S. military will have dozens or even hundreds of airfields and ports that can be used on an ad hoc basis.
That way, even if some places are knocked out, others can continue to fight.
02
On paper or on the ground for real
It sounds like the distributed deployment and guerrilla strategy proposed by U.S. Army General Snyder.
It seems to have found a panacea for the Chinese missile threat.
But in reality, this strategy has been talked about by the U.S. military hierarchy for several years, but it is still stuck in the slogan stage, without clear implementation.
After World War II, the U.S. military established hundreds of military bases around the world, forming a complete system of forward deployment.
These bases not only have military functions, but also assume a deterrent role.
Rashly abandoning these bases in favor of decentralized deployment will be seen by allies as a signal of U.S. retreat or reduced commitment, shaking the U.S. alliance system in the Asia-Pacific.
Second, from a practical point of view, decentralized deployment faces enormous challenges.
The U.S. military has to establish outposts on dozens of small islands in the Pacific.
Each of those places needs to be built with runways, storage facilities, communications equipment, air defense systems, and so on.
Diplomatic negotiations would be enough of a headache for the U.S. military.
The U.S. military spent years negotiating for the right to use a few more bases in the Philippines.
In the end, there were all sorts of restrictions.
How much would it cost to spread the troops out to dozens of small bases, each with its own maintenance staff, spare parts, fuel, etc.?
With the U.S. national debt already topping $30 trillion, Congress certainly wouldn’t approve this additional spending.
There’s one fatal issue that’s been overlooked
No matter how much U.S. troops are dispersed and deployed on Pacific islands, supply routes still cannot be decentralized!
No matter how much they are decentralized, their supply ships still have to transport their supplies from the sea lanes within the one or two island chain.
Historically, logistical resupply has always been a key factor in deciding whether a war is won or lost.
Napoleon’s failed expedition to Russia was largely due to supply lines being stretched too long
In World War II, Germany’s defeat in North Africa was inextricably linked to the Allies’ success in cutting off its Mediterranean supply lines.
In the Pacific War, the key to the defeat of Japan by the US army was the destruction of Japan’s maritime supply lines, leaving Japan out of ammunition and food.
Today’s U.S. Army, although advanced equipment.
But the belly is bigger than any army in history.
An F 35 fighter jet, on a daily mission, needs tons of aviation fuel, ammo, and spare parts.
A Marine Corps, the company consumes several tons of food, drinking water and other supplies every day.
If the U.S. military does implement a distributed deployment, spreading its forces over dozens of Pacific islands.
Every day, hundreds or even thousands of tons of supplies would need to be transported.
These materials can only be transported on a large scale by sea, and air transportation is too costly and inefficient.
03
Strong reconnaissance capability
China, with its now formidable reconnaissance capabilities, is able to monitor maritime activity in almost the entire Western Pacific region in real time.
In addition to satellites, China has a number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the Pterodactyl Rainbow, that are capable of carrying out long-duration reconnaissance missions at sea.
When the U.S. military shifted from centralized to distributed deployments, what had been a dense network of fires was split up.
An example.
In the past, a carrier battle group concentrated 75 fighters in a radius of about 500 kilometers.
Now, these fighters are spread out over 15 small island bases, with only 5 fighters each, a significant reduction in coverage capability.
These small, dispersed units may be broken up one by one.
The U.S. military’s distributed deployment is like spreading out what was a powerful fist into a palm.
Although the area covered becomes larger, each finger is far less powerful than the entire fist.
The PLA may be like scissors, able to easily cut these scattered fingers one by one.
Some military commentators have argued that the distributed deployment proposed by the U.S. military brass is more of a psychological placebo.
It is a psychological compensation for the growing threat of Chinese missiles and the inability to respond effectively.
In the face of China’s growing missile threat, the U.S. military needs to give Congress, its allies, and itself an explanation that we have a plan to deal with it.
Even if it’s a program that may never actually be implemented.
In the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, did the U.S. send two carrier battle groups to strut their stuff around the Taiwan Strait, and there was little China could do about it except protest diplomatically?
Now the wind and water are turning.
Twenty-seven years have passed, and the military balance in the Asia-Pacific has been radically tilted.
It is difficult for a clever woman to cook without rice.
Even if the U.S. military is tactically superb, it is difficult to reverse the strategic disadvantage without sufficient hard goods to support it.
The PLA’s progress is not achieved by magic, but by a solid industrial base, technological progress and sustained investment.
When the U.S. aircraft carriers flaunted their power at China’s doorstep, they did not expect that one day, this invincible fleet would have to be careful in the Western Pacific Ocean.
This is not boasting, but the truth.
EN
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